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INFORMATION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

COUNTRY

Germany (Russian Zone)

DATE DISTR. 11 March 1948

SUBJECT

Resignation of Oberspreewerke Specialist;
Current Production Situation

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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH
USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

SOURCE

1. A crisis developed in the Oberspreewerke's department for chemical-metallurgical research, after its chief, Ing. Frenz, failed to return from leave. When Frenz called the OSW by telephone and gave notice that he did not intend to return, the Russian manager immediately cancelled all furloughs and recalled all employees currently on leave.
2. It was found that Frenz had taken with him all important data concerning his work, including the final report on the results of his research activities. Most of his colleagues was posted on his work, so that there was no one at the OSW who could take his place.
3. Frenz was a specialist on tungsten and molybdenum alloys and on the production of sheet-iron and wire made from such alloys. He also worked on the development of alloys suited for tubes of all kinds, and on the development of pastes. He evolved various kinds of glass, necessary for the production of tubes, which would achieve the proper coefficient of expansion between glass and metal. He also developed "Getterungsverfahren" through which the efficiency of receiving and transmitting valves was greatly improved. Frenz's research also resulted in the production of cathode pastes with special emissivity - - such as Pernico, Fink, Silfos - - having new relative compositions. The factory management attributed the gradual decrease in the numbers of faulty and rejected tubes caused by cracks in the glass, explosions, emissions, etc., to the work of Frenz (the rejected material originally represented 85% of production).
4. Frenz's resignation will undoubtedly have an adverse effect on future Oberspreewerke operations. It is doubtful whether the projected special department for the production of tungsten and molybdenum alloys, and of sheet-iron and wires, which was to be set up under Frenz, can now be established. It is likewise doubtful whether the work in connection with the different processes of evaporation, through which, it is hoped, some metals might be found as substitutes for gold, can be continued. The work entrusted to Frenz in the field of alloys and pastes was redistributed among the chemists Auer, Schoefer, and Gamsa.

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5. During a meeting, held shortly before Christmas 1947, the Soviet manager of the Oberapparatwerke expressed his satisfaction with the production results achieved up to the time. He mentioned that 98% of the planned work had been delivered, and that the delivery date for the remaining 2% of the work program was to be extended to 10 January 1948.
6. Remarks made by Russian officials disclosed that they, too, were under strong pressure as regards the termination of the planned work for 1947. The Soviet representatives proposed on two instances that it be declared, contrary to the actual status of production, that the planned work had been carried through one hundred per cent. The development of "Ignitron" failed through the failure of special welding equipment to be delivered on time. The Soviet representatives proposed, in order to prove that the development work had been finished, to remove the name-plate from an old AEG tube and to replace it with an OSW name-plate. In this way it could be proven to the Moscow agencies that the work had been successful. As to the reconstruction of the 1g11 Telefunken tube, the OSW was advised to report that the planned work had been completed, and to omit sending in documentary proof to that effect. It was thought that the assignment would be finished by the time Moscow had sent in a request for the appropriate data.
7. The Russian supervisory officer, Levit, was replaced by one Akulin in December 1947; no reason was given for this change.

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